:Law:

:::alpha:::

:::Banner of the Sacre-Coeur
of our Brother: King
of these Kings in his Kingdom
on his Earth in his Heavens,
as our Judge & Redeemer:::

:::Our Father,
who art in Heaven,
Holy be thy name:
Thy Kingdom Come:::

:IRS:
Infernal-Revenue-Service

:::sophia:::

:::Stamp against all evil
by our Virgin-Mother: Queen,
Coredemptrix and
Mediatrix of all Graces,
as our Counselor & Advocate:::

:Article~I, Section~8: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;"
:Article~I, Section~8: "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;"
:Article~I, Section~9: specifically prohibits Congress from taxing "exports" from the states. The Constitution does NOT give Congress jurisdiction over "commerce within the several states " (intrastate commerce)
:Article~IV, Section~3: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state."

:Sixteenth Amendment: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
1. does not permit the direct taxation of incomes without apportionment.
2. does not change Congress' limited Constitutional power to tax. (:see: Treasury Decision~2303, 1916; reconfirmed by Supreme Court, 1988)
3. does not impose the income tax.

:Conclusion of the Law: For the limits of the power of the Congress for the taxation is with the limits of the jurisdictions of the foreign-commerce and federal-possessions by the Constitution.

"The federal government has two kinds of jurisdiction:
1. "Exclusive jurisdiction "is absolute control over land owned by the federal government (the District of Columbia, federal possessions and U.S. Territories, and land within the 50 states ceded to the federal government, such as military bases).
2. " Subject matter jurisdiction " refers to matters which the Constitution puts under federal control , including within the 50 states."

Pollock (1895): throws out 1894 income tax law passed by Congress.

Brushaber v. Union Pacific (240 U.S. 1), and Stanton v. Baltic Mining (240 U.S. 103) reverse Pollock and claim income tax is and has always been an indirect "excise" tax which never required "apportionment."

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out."

Eisner v. Macomber (1919) first defines the term "income" as proceeds derived or severed from capital, from labor, or from both combined, noting that, by being severed from their source, these proceeds (the income) becomes separate personal property.
(A tax on personal property is by its nature always a direct tax, and must be apportioned. The 16th Amendment never changed that fact. For that reason, the income tax, if imposed on income earned only inside the united States must be apportioned. Congress can legally impose the tax without apportionment only on income earned in foreign commerce or in US possessions. This is so because Congress has general jurisdiction in these areas, and is therefore not limited by the constitutional requirement for direct taxes.)

U.S. v. MERRIAM, 263 U.S. 179 (1923) "On behalf of the government it is urged that taxation is a practical matter and concerns itself with the substance of the thing upon which the tax is imposed rather than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most [263 U.S. 179, 188] important for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer."

Commissioner of Int. Rev. V. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948) "This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."

U.S. v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) "[We] do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. 7805 (a). In this area of limitless factual variations, "it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate adjustments."... The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner."

United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973) "We recognize that this Court is not in the business of administering the tax laws of the Nation. Congress has delegated that task to the Secretary of the Treasury, 26 U.S.C. 7805 (a), and regulations promulgated under his authority, if found to "implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner," must be upheld."

National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) "In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period ,the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute."

"The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever source derived" of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)

Boeing case: Supreme Court Justice: Clarence: Thomas:"Before placing its hand in the taxpayer's pocket, the Government must place its finger on the law authorizing its action."

"The provisions of the sixteenth amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited [Congress' original power to tax incomes] from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation, to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment." Treasury Decision ~2303

"Rules are prescribed for determination of gross income and taxable income derived from sources within and without the United States ... §§ 1.861-1 through 1.864. (Secs. 861-864; '54 Code.) " Treasury Decision ~6258

Underwood Tariff Act of 1913 (Section II) imposes the "income tax" which is not a tax on income, but on foreign commerce, using income as a measure.

1916 Act repeals Underwood Tariff Act, and does not tax domestic incomes of US citizens. The only taxable commerce specifically shown in the law to be taxable is international.

"Art. 31. What included in gross income. -Gross income includes in general compensation for personal and professional services, business income, profits from sales of and dealings in property, interest, rent, dividends, and gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever, unless exempt from tax by law. See section 213 (b). Profits derived from sales in foreign commerce must be included in gross income. Income may be in the form of cash or of property. Dividends (other than stock dividends, see opinion of Supreme court in case of Eisner v. Macomber, T. D. 3010) are taxed at the rates for the year in which paid. See section 201 of the statute and articles 1541-1549. The amount of income tax paid for a bondholder by an obligor pursuant to a tax-free covenant in its bonds is in the nature of additional interest paid the bondholder and must be included in his gross income. He is not, however, entitled to deduct from gross income the amount of such income tax paid on his behalf, but is entitled to credit such amount against his total income tax otherwise due. See sections 214 (a) 3 and 221 (b) of the statute and articles 565 and 566. As to the basis for determining gain or loss from sales see section 202 and articles 1561-1570. As to the gross income of corporations see section 233 and articles 541-550. In general, income is the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."

"Art. 71. What excluded from gross income. -Gross income excludes the items of income specifically exempted by the statute and also certain other kinds of income by statute or fundamental law free from tax. Such tax-free income should not be included in the return of income and need not be mentioned in the return, unless information regarding it is specifically called for, as in the case, for example, of interest on municipal bonds. See article 402. The exclusion of such income should not be confused with the reduction of taxable income by the application of allowable deductions. See section 212 of the statute and article 21. As to exclusions from gross income by corporations, see section 233 and article 541."

"Sec. 217. (a) In the case of a nonresident alien individual or of a citizen entitled to the benefits of section 262, the following items of gross income shall be treated as income from sources within the United States:" Certain types of domestic income are to be included in full as taxable domestic income for: "1. Foreigners 2. Americans receiving most of their income from federal possessions (technically foreign to the states, like Guam or Puerto Rico)"

:History: In the years through 1939, the law becomes more specific, stating who is taxable: foreigners with domestic income, U.S. citizens with foreign income, and U.S. citizens with income mostly from possessions. In 1954 this information is removed. In 1978, it shows up in convoluted form as Section 861.

IRM § 4.10.7.2.3.1 "Income Tax Regulations. The Federal Income Tax Regulations (Regs.) are the official Treasury Department interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code "

IRM § 4.10.7.2.3.4 "Authority of the Regulations. The Service is bound by the regulations ."
To find out if you owe taxes, you must consult both:
1. The statutes found in Title 26 (Internal Revenue Code) of the United States Code (26 USC), and
2. The related regulations found in Title 26 (Internal Revenue) of the Code of Federal Regulations (26 CFR).

26 USC Subchapter A § 1 imposes the income tax on "taxable income." USC Index: "Taxable income, Sources within U.S., see 861" (USC Index is not being made available on the Internet.)

26 USC Subchapter B § 63 defines "taxable income" as "gross income" minus allowable deductions. USC Index: "Deductions, Taxable income from within U.S., see 861" (USC Index is not being made available on the Internet.)

26 USC Subchapter B § 61 defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever source derived, including but not limited to the following items...." Cross-reference Notes of same page: "Income from sources - Within the United States, see section 861 of this title. Without the United States, see section 862 of this title." USC Index: "Gross income, sources within U.S., see 861" (USC Index is not being made available on the Internet.)

:Law-Claim: for the volition for the clouding of the title/term: "taxable income" with the code is with these certifications by the attorney-authors:
~1. title of the tax as an "income tax" with the lack of the subject: income, and with the subject: source as the foreign-commerce, and
~2. triple-transfer for the location of the meaning of the term: "source", and
~3. location of the meaning of the term "source" with the Subchapter N (:1924-law: § 210 Tax imposed on "net income"; § 213
"Items" of income that may be taxable; and § 217 Determines what types of income are considered domestic and which individuals can be taxed on such income.), and
~4. lack of any claim with these sections of the code for any reference of the mandate of the viewing of the "Subchapter N, Section 861" and of the following-sections for the completion of the meaning and identification of any "taxable income", and
~5. elimination of the sole: "cross reference" at the bottom of "26 USC § 61" for both versions of the USC with the year of our Lord: 2001: GPO and USCA
~6. lack of the availability of the title: "USC Index" on the internet for the ease of the finding of the meaning of the source by the public.

26 CFR §1.861-8 shows that the taxable "sources of income" from within the United States apply only to those engaged in international or foreign commerce, and commerce within federal possessions.

26 USC § 861(b) & 26 CFR § 1.861-8(f)(1)(i) show that the only time the income of a U.S. citizen is taxable is if it is related to certain specific types of foreign and international commerce. The Constitution does not give Congress jurisdiction over purely domestic commerce, where all transactions occur completely within the 50 states, and such incomes are not shown to be taxable under federal law.

26 CFR § 1.861-1: "Sec. 1.861-1 Income from sources within the United States. (a) Categories of income. Part I ( section 861 and following), subchapter N, chapter 1 of the Code, and the regulations thereunder determine the sources of income for purposes of the income tax."

26 CFR § 1.863-1(c): "Determination of taxable income. The taxpayer's taxable income from sources within or without the United States will be determined under the rules of Secs. 1.861-8 through 1.861-14T for determining taxable income from sources within the United States."

26 CFR § 1.861-1: "The taxable income from sources within the United States shall be determined by deducting therefrom, in accordance with sections 861(b) and 863(a), [allowable deductions]. See Secs. 1.861-8 and 1.863-1. "

26 CFR § 1.861-8: "Sections 861(b) and 863(a) state in general terms how to determine taxable income of a taxpayer from sources within the United States after gross income from sources within the United States has been determined. "

26 CFR § 1.862-1: "Sec. 1.861-8 [is the section] for determining the taxable income from sources within the United States."

26 CFR § 1.863-6: "Secs. 1.861-1 to 1.863-5 [give the principles] for determining the gross and the taxable income from sources within and without the United States."

:Maxim: expressio unis et exclusio alterus = an express reference to one matter means that other matters should be excluded (when interpreting statutory law)

The only situations in which domestic income is taxable is when foreigners receive the income because this is specifically mentioned in the law: 1.861-8(f)(1)(iv).
The only situations in which foreign income is taxable for individuals is when U.S. citizens receive the income because this is specifically mentioned in the law: 1.861-8(f)(1)(i).
The statutes and regulations, past and present, also specifically point out the taxation of certain income related to federal possessions: 1.861-8(f)(1)(vi)(E). (:original-law: 80%)

In order for there to be taxable domestic income, all of the following must occur:
One must receive a taxable "item" of income such as compensation, interest, rents, etc. (per 26 USC § 61 and following).
The "source rules" must categorize the income as domestic income (per 26 USC § 861(a) and 26 CFR §§ 1.861-2 through 1.861-7 ).
The income must derive from a "specific source or activity" which is taxable (per 26 USC § 861(b) and 26 CFR § 1.861-8 and following). :source.

:Download: for the showing of the Regulations with the Agent of the I.R.S. (:see: end of the page)

BAR member Larry Becraft assembled this analysis of arguments (however valid in the truth of the law) that have been rejected by the opinions of BAR members dba judges in statutory fiction courts under private corporate law:

In the seventies and early eighties, advocates of the specie
provisions in Art. 1, §10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution made a
concerted effort to educate people about this constitutional provision,
consequently people (mostly those who were desperate and ill-prepared)
acting pro se began litigating the issue. The courts have rendered the
following adverse decisions on this issue:

1. Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968)
2. United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973)
3. Milam v. United States, 524 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1974)
4. United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975)
5. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1976)
6. United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976)
7. United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1976)
8. United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976)
9. United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976)
10. United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1977)
11. Mathes v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978)
12. United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978)
13. United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978)
14. United States v. Benson, 592 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1979)
15. Nyhus v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1979)
16. United States v. Hori, 470 F.Supp. 1209 (C.D.Cal. 1979)
17. United States v. Tissi, 601 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1979)
18. United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979)
19. United States v. Moon, 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980)
20. United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980)
21. Birkenstock v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981)
22. Lary v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 296 (11th Cir. 1988)

1. Chermack v. Bjornson, 302 Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974)
2. Leitch v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 519 P.2d 1045 (Or.App. 1974)
3. Radue v. Zanaty, 293 Ala. 585, 308 So.2d 242 (1975)
4. Rush v. Casco Bank & Trust Co., 348 A.2d 237 (Me. 1975)
5. Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan.App.2d 301, 564 P.2d 552 (1977)
6. State v. Pina, 90 N.M. 181, 561 P.2d 43 (N.M. 1977)
7. Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1978)
8. Trohimovich v. Dir., Dept. of Labor & Industry, 21 Wash.App. 243,
584 P.2d 467 (1978)
9. Middlebrook v. Miss. State Tax Comm., 387 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1980)
10. Daniels v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 601 S.W.2d 845 (Ark. 1980)
11. State v. Gasser, 306 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1981)
12. City of Colton v. Corbly, 323 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1982)
13. Epperly v. Alaska, 648 P.2d 609 (Ak.App. 1982)
14. Solyom v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 452
A.2d 1283 (Md.App. 1982)
15. People v. Lawrence, 124 Mich.App. 230, 333 N.W.2d 525 (Mich.App.
1983)
16. Union State Bank v. Miller, 335 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1983)
17. Richardson v. Richardson, 332 N.W.2d 524 (Mich.App. 1983)
18. Cohn v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 138 Ariz. 136, 673 P.2d 334 (1983)
19. First Nat. Bank of Black Hills v. Treadway, 339 N.W.2d 119 (S.D.
1983)
20. Herald v. State, 107 Idaho 640, 691 P.2d 1255 (1984)
21. Allnutt v. State, 59 Md.App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984)
22. Spurgeon v. F.T.B., 160 Cal.App.3d 524, 206 Cal.Rptr. 636 (1984)
23. Rothaker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal Dist., 703 S.W.2d
235 (Tex.App. 1985)
24. De Jong v. County of Chester, 98 Pa. Cmwlth. 85, 510 A.2d 902
(1986)
25. Baird v. County Assessors of Salt Lake & Utah Counties, 779 P.2d
676 (Utah 1989)
26. State v. Sanders, 923 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1996).

Back in about 1979 or 1980, Bob Golden and Pete Soehnlen published a
work entitled Are You Required, which persuasively advocated the argument
that wages are not income. However, desperate people championed this issue
and lost in the following cases:

1. United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)
2. Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting "even
exchange" argument)
3. United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982)
4. Granzow v. CIR, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984)
5. Hansen v. United States, 744 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1984)
6. Perkins v. CIR, 746 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1984)
7. Schiff v. CIR, 751 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir. 1984)
8. Ficalora v. CIR, 751 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
income includes compensation for services)
9. Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984)
10. United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747 (7th Cir. 1985)
11. Hyslep v. United States, 765 F.2d 1083 (11th Cir. 1985)
12. Coleman v. CIR, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986)
13. Stubbs v. Commissioner of IRS, 797 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting argument that wages are not taxable income as "patently
frivolous")
14. Wilcox v. CIR, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988)
15. Maisano v. United States, 908 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1990), and
Maisano v. United States, 940 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1991)
16. United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993).

Jeff Dickstein, lawyer "extraordinare" from California, later Alaska,
Montana, Tennessee and now Oklahoma, has written a book entitled Judicial
Tyranny, which discusses this issue in great detail, including all the
adverse decisions on this issue through 1989. When Jeff and I were about to
start the conspiracy trial of Vern Holland and Dave Mauldin in Tulsa in
August, 1990, Jeff announced that his book was hot off the press. When we
got the first copy and looked at his book just days before we were to start
that trial in federal court in Tulsa, we noticed that the front cover
contained the seal of the local federal court as well as a likeness of one
of the local federal judges. At times, Jeff can be harrowing. However, we
got a hung jury in that case and afterwards, 6 of the jurors, including the
forelady, came and joined Vern's patriot organization.

Back in 1982 or 1983, somebody started circulating the argument that
the IRS was a private corporation which had been created in Delaware in
1933. If it was created only in 1933, then why do we have the following
appropriations for this agency found in acts of Congress a decade before
1933: 42 Stat. 375 (2-17-22); 42 Stat. 454 (3-20-22); 42 Stat. 1096
(1-3-23); 43 Stat. 71 (4-4-24); 43 Stat. 693 (12-5-24); 43 Stat. 757
(1-20-25); 43 Stat. 770 (1-22-25); 44 Stat. 142 (3-2-26); 44 Stat. 868
(7-3-26); 44 Stat. 1033 (1-26-27); 45 Stat. 168, 1034 (1928); 68 Stat. 86,
145, 807 (1954).

This is indeed a frivolous argument and has properly been rejected by
the courts; see Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, 147 (N.D. Ind. 1984). The
real issue is whether the IRS has been created by law.

Some contend that the Secretary of the Treasury is in reality a
foreign agent under the control of the IMF; the argument has been rejected
by the courts.

1. United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 413 (8th Cir. 1992)
2. United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Higgins, 987 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 1993).

Some contend we are for tax purposes non-resident aliens; again, this
improper argument has been correctly rejected by the courts.

1. United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991)
2. United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993)
4. United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1994) ("federal zone"
case)
5. Larue v. United States, 959 F.Supp. 957 (C.D.Ill. 1997).

But the rejection by the courts of this issue has not deterred Lynn
Meredith, who has continued to promote this argument through her book,
Vultures in Eagles Clothing, via a multi-level sales scheme. Fraud is a
knowing misrepresentation of facts (or in this case, law) to another upon
which that other party relies to his detriment. Concerned Americans have
been trying the program promoted by Meredith in her book, but when they get
into trouble, they get absolutely no help from Meredith as she refuses to
even answer their calls. She spends her spare time on cruise ships.
Incidentally, when Lynn was here in Alabama, she stated to James
Shackelford of Tuscaloosa, that she has made better than 3 million bux off
this movement.

This argument was rejected in Richey v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue,
634 N.E. 2d 1375 (Ind. 1994), along with other popular arguments of that
date.

At one time, some asserted that when an agent of the government
inflicted damaged upon somebody, the proper response should be filing a Form
1099 against the agent because the agent was "enriched" by the damaged so
inflicted. Parties doing this went to jail.

1. United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992)
2. United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992)
3. United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1993).

Of course, today we have essentially the same thing in the format of
filing of common law liens. More than enough people have gone to jail with
such lunacy.

Back in 1983 and 1984, Carol Landi popularized an argument that the
land patent was the highest and best form of title and that by updating the
patent in your own name, you could defeat any mortgages. This contention
violated many principles of real property and when Carol started trying to
get patents for most of the land in California brought up into her own name,
she went to jail. Others who have raised this crazy argument lost the issue.

1. Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1984)
2. Sui v. Landi, 209 Cal.Rptr. 449 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985)
3. Hilgeford v. People's Bank, 607 F.Supp. 536 (N.D.Ind. 1985)
4. Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mtg. Co., 612 F.Supp. 253
(N.D. Ind. 1985)
5. Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F.Supp. 890 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
6. Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1986)
7. Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n. of St. Louis, 505 N.E.2d 387
(Ill. App. 1987).

Some have contended that they were not "persons" under the Internal
Revenue Code, an argument which has been lost.

1. Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (all
individuals, natural or unnatural, are subject to federal income tax on
their wages)
2. United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1986)
3. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir.
1986)(defendant who contended she was not a "taxpayer" because she was an
"absolute, freeborn and natural individual" raised frivolous argument);
4. United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986)
5. Itz v. United States Tax Court, 1987 WL 15893, at 5, 87-2 USTC
¶ 9497 (W.D.Tex. May 6, 1987) (claim of plaintiff that he is a "de
jure" citizen as opposed to a "de facto" citizen is without merit)
6. Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1447-48 (10th Cir.
1990)(plaintiff is a person subject to federal income tax, invalidating
numerous other frivolous tax protester arguments)
7. United States v. Silevan, 985 F.2d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 1993)
8. United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993)(these
parties raised but had rejected the arguments that the US has no "inland
jurisdiction," that wages were not income, and that the federal income tax
is voluntary. "And finally, we reject appellant's contention that they are
not citizens of the United States, but rather 'Free Citizens of the Republic
of Minnesota,' and consequently not subject to taxation").

A popular argument currently circulating is that a mere notice of levy
is not equal to a levy and thus may not be used for tax collection purposes.
The courts have not accepted this idea.

1. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1955)
2. Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1962)
3. United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1971)
4. In re Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc., 495 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th
Cir. 1974)
5. Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1986)
6. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 79 S.Ct. 641 (1959).

Some assert that some unknown treaty back in the 1930s placed us under
the control of the "international bankers," thus every action filed in this
country, both civil and criminal alike, is for the benefit of the bankers.
Under these facts, when the government attacks a patriot, he should assert
the UCC argument; this silly contention has been rejected.

1. United States v. Stoecklin, 848 F.Supp. 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
2. United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.Tex. 1996)(also
raised flag and common law court issues)
3. United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997)(also
raised nom de guerre and flag issues).

The Code of Federal Regulations contains a separate volume which list
various statutes and the regulations which implement those statutes. This is
not an exclusive list nor is it an admission made by the government that
there are no regulations for Title 26, U.S.C. Parties making this argument
have suffered defeat.

1. United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993)
2. Russell v. United States, 95 CCH Tax Cases ¶ 50029 (W.D. Mich.
1994)
3. Reese v. CIR, 69 TCM 2814, TC Memo 1995-244 (1995)(this and several
other arguments described as "legalistic gibberish")
4. Morgan v. CIR, 78 AFTR2d 96-6633 (M.D.Fla. 1996)
5. Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.

A current popular argument is that the gold fringed flag indicates the
admiralty jurisdiction of the court. Naturally, pro ses have made this
argument and lost.

1. Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(the
argument has "no arguable basis in law or fact")
2. Comm. v. Appel, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa.Super. 1994)(the contention
is a "preposterous claim")
3. United States v. Schiefen, 926 F.Supp. 877, 884 (D.S.D. 1995): in
this case, the CFR cross reference index argument, and those regarding the
UCC, common law courts and the flag issue were rejected.
4. McCann v. Greenway, 952 F.Supp. 647 (W.D.Mo. 1997)
5. Sadlier v. Payne, 974 F.Supp. 1411 (D.Utah 1997)
6. Schneider v. Schlaefer, 975 F.Supp. 1160 (E.D.Wis. 1997)
Of course, there are other decisions which have not been published.
But against all odds, Dave Miller still travels the country promoting this
lost cause.

1. Kimmel v. Burnet County Appraisal Dist., 835 S.W.2d 108, 109
(Tex.App. 1992).

According to a book written by Berkheimer, a "nom de guerre" is a war
name symbolized by a given name being written in capital letters. The
argument contends that because of events in 1933, we have been made
"enemies" and government indicates our status as enemies by the nom de
guerre. If this is true, then why have the styles of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court since its establishment been in caps? This
argument has gotten lots of people in trouble. For example, Mike Kemp of the
Gadsden Militia defended himself on state criminal charges with this
argument and he was thrown into jail. I have not even seen a decent brief on
this issue which was predicated upon cases you can find in an ordinary law
library. In any event, at least one case has rejected this argument; see
United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997).

Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985)(stating that
"Congress's failure to enact a title into positive law has only evidentiary
significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or
unenforceable"); United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (D. Conn.
1984) (holding that "the failure of Congress to enact a title as such and in
such form into positive law . . . in no way impugns the validity, effect,
enforceability or constitutionality of the laws as contained and set forth
in the title"), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 805 (1985); Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 149 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(asserting that "even if Title 26 was not itself enacted into positive law,
that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void");
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 780, 784 (1985)
(averring that the I.R.C. "is truly 'positive law'"), aff'd, 802 F.2d 429
(Fed. Cir. 1986).

1. McKinney v. Regan, 599 F.Supp. 126, 129 (M.D.La.
1984)("Petitioner's shield of the 'Common Law' as an 'Unenfranchised
Sovereign Individual of the United States of America, a Republic,' provides
him with precisely the same degree of protection from federal income
taxation as did the Ghost Dance of the Sioux warrior from the repeating
rifles of the federal Calvary [sic] -- ZERO")
2. Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990)(the
following arguments are completely lacking in legal merit and patently
frivolous: (1) individuals ("free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural,
individual common law 'de jure' citizens of a state, etc.") are not
"persons" subject to taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; (2) the
authority of the United States is confined to the District of Columbia; (3)
the income tax is a direct tax which is invalid absent apportionment; (4)
the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution is either invalid or applies
only to corporations; (5) wages are not income; (6) the income tax is
voluntary); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. United States v. Kruger, 923 F.2d 587, 587-88 (8th Cir. 1991)("The
Krugers' principle argument below and on appeal is that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
unlawfully purported to bestow citizenship upon non-white races and other
'artificial statutory persons.' This argument is absurd").

Perhaps the most famous "Wangrudite" was John Cheek, whose criminal
conviction went to the U.S. Supreme Court; see Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991). John sent to me copies of his motions and
briefs that he filed in his case, one of which was just a single page motion
which in essence stated that he could not be prosecuted because he was not a
14th amendment citizen. Naturally, such a non-substantive motion was denied.
Cheek's appeal would have involved this argument if he had reached the
conclusion that it had merit. However, the only issue which was decided in
the appeal to the Supreme Court regarded the validity of the "willfulness"
jury instruction given at trial.

United States v. Hartman, 915 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Fla. 1996): argument
regarding implementing regs and the cross references in CFR index held
frivolous.
Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.

In McLaughlin v. CIR, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987), this
argument was held to be without merit.
XIX. SIMPLE FACTS REGARDING "SUBJECTS OF THE BRITISH CROWN" ISSUE

1. The Articles of Confederation provided as follows:
"Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled."
2. Our country and the British Crown signed the Treaty of Peace on
September 3, 1783, the first provision of which reads as follows:
"His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz,
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, to be free,
sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the
government, proprietary and territorial rights of the same, and every part
thereof."

Does this 1783 Peace Treaty still exist? All one needs to do to
confirm this is to check out a government publication entitled "Treaties
in Force" which can be found in any good library, especially a
university library. Under the list of our treaties with Great Britain and
the United Kingdom, you will find that this 1783 treaty is still in effect,
at least a part of it: "Only article 1 is in force." The War of 1812
resulted in modifications of this treaty and so did later treaties.
3. The courts have not been silent regarding the effect of the
Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Peace. For example, the
consequences of independence was explained in Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527 (1827), where the Supreme Court stated:
"There was no territory within the United States that was claimed in
any other right than that of some one of the confederated states; therefore,
there could be no acquisition of territory made by the United States
distinct from, or independent of some one of the states.
"Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the
limits of its territory.
"[T]he soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as
much theirs at the declaration of independence as at this hour."
In M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808), the
Supreme Court held:
"This opinion is predicated upon a principle which is believed to be
undeniable, that the several states which composed this Union, so far at
least as regarded their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the
time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers
of sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made
by the British king. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of their
independence, not a grant of it. From hence it results, that the laws of the
several state governments were the laws of sovereign states, and as such
were obligatory upon the people of such state, from the time they were
enacted."
In reference to the Treaty of Peace, this same court stated:
"It contains an acknowledgment of the independence and sovereignty of
the United States, in their political capacities, and a relinquishment on
the part of His Britannic Majesty, of all claim to the government, propriety
and territorial rights of the same. These concessions amounted, no doubt, to
a formal renunciation of all claim to the allegiance of the citizens of the
United States."
Finally, in Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3
Peters) 99, 120-122 (1830), the question squarely arose as to whether
Americans are "subjects of the crown," a proposition flatly rejected by the
Court:
"It is universally admitted both in English courts and in those of our
own country, that all persons born within the colonies of North America,
whilst subject to the crown of Great Britain, were natural born British
subjects, and it must necessarily follow that that character was changed by
the separation of the colonies from the parent State, and the acknowledgment
of their independence.
"The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati
ceased to be British subjects, differs in this country and in England, as
established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The
English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is
to take the date of the Declaration of Independence."
In support of the rule set forth in this case, the court cited an
English case to demonstrate that the English courts had already decided that
Americans were not subjects of the crown:
"The doctrine of perpetual allegiance is not applied by the British
courts to the American antenati. This is fully shown by the late case of Doe
v. Acklam, 2 Barn. & Cresw. 779. Chief Justice Abbott says: ‘James Ludlow,
the father of Francis May, the lessor of the plaintiff, was undoubtedly born
a subject of Great Britain. He was born in a part of America which was at
the time of his birth a British colony, and parcel of the dominions of the
crown of Great Britain; but upon the facts found, we are of opinion that he
was not a subject of the crown of Great Britain at the time of the birth of
his daughter. She was born after the independence of the colonies was
recognized by the crown of Great Britain; after the colonies had become
United States, and their inhabitants generally citizens of those States, and
her father, by his continued residence in those States, manifestly became a
citizen of them.' He considered the Treaty of Peace as a release from their
allegiance of all British subjects who remained there. A declaration, says
he, that a State shall be free, sovereign and independent, is a declaration
that the people composing the State shall no longer be considered as
subjects of the sovereign by whom such a declaration is made."

A popular belief promoted in the freedom movement is the concept
or idea that the United States is a foreign sovereign as regards the states.
How this idea got started is beyond me because the U.S. Supreme Court and
other courts have concluded otherwise; see Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,
136 (1876)("The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the
several States"); Severson v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 88 P.2d 344, 347 (Ok.
1939)(quotes Clafin); Bowles v. Heckman, 64 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind.
1946)(quotes Clafin); Kersting v. Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309, 310 (N.J.
1946)(summarizes Clafin); Harrison v. Herzig Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Ky.
445, 161 S.W.2d 908, 910 (1942)(quotes Clafin); Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I.
256, 43 A.2d 467, 471 (1945)(quotes Clafin and further states "the several
States of the Union are neither foreign to the United States nor are they
foreign to each other")." :source:

:Summary: Why argue facts, truth or law in a court of fiction, opinion and presumption?

Freedom Above Fortune News
Dear Friends:
I am proud to announce that the number of former IRS officials who
have
openly and publicly lent their voices to the chorus of professionals
and
citizens who believe that the IRS is knowingly misapplying the federal
income tax laws has now reached the size of a basketball team. If
recent developments are any indication, the basketball-sized "truth
team" of former IRS officials will soon grow to the size of a
"football
team", and later to the size of a "football stadium".
The newest member is Clifton Beale. Clifton spent nearly 19 years
with
the Internal Revenue Service. He was an IRS Revenue Agent from
November, 1979 through August 1987, and an IRS Appeals Officer from
August, 1987 to September, 1998. Among his many accomplishments,
Clifton is an accomplished author and has a Master's Degree in
Taxation.
Clifton has three grown children and four grandchildren.
According to Clifton's website ( www.cliftonbeale.com ), he is a
strong
believer in complying with the rules and regulations of the United
States Code, Constitution, Supreme Court cases still in force and
other
Positive Laws registered in the U. S. Federal Register applicable to
compliance of the entities as written, tried and considered. As you
can
see from the information on his website, being an advocate for the
Constitution and believing in complying with the United States Code
has
caused the IRS to take a disliking to him, which is an all too common
occurrence among "basketball team" members.
The "basketball team" roster now includes (in alphabetical order):
Joseph R. Banister, C.P.A., former IRS-CID Special Agent
Clifton Beale, CEP, A.S., B.S., MS-Taxation, Former IRS Revenue Agent
and Appeals Officer
Paul Chappell, Attorney at Law, former U.S. Tax Court Clerk, IRS Chief
Counsel Attorney
Sherry P. Jackson, C.P.A., C.F.E., former IRS Revenue Agent
John Turner, E.A., former IRS Revenue Officer
Our "bench" includes many other former IRS personnel who have yet to
permit their names to be used publicly. The 5 "starters" anxiously
await permission from the "benchwarmers" to announce their names so
that
they can come out onto the court and show the American audience what
our
IRS opponent is truly about. The "starters" are getting tired and
taking lots of elbows, knees, and other cheap shots and we need a full
bench.

:Claim of the Font: Italic: For the use of the italic-font is with the common-tongue of the verb-fiction. For a sample of this use is with the documentation for a quotation of a communication with the writing or speaking by its author. For another sample of the use is for the identification of the name of an fiction-entity.

:Claim of the Font: Bold: For the use of the bold-font is for the emphasis with a matter for the benefit of the ease of the identification and comprehension of the concepts of the document.

:Claim of the Font: Line: For the use of the font with a line at the base of the letters is for the web-link with the source for the confirmation of the matter, or with a page for the study of a concept of the document.

:Claim of the Punctuation: Colon: For the use of full colons is for the meaning as a phrase for the security of the next-word:: meaning word with the nexus, as a noun.

:Claim of the Punctuation: Quotation: For the use of the pairs of the opening and closing: quotation-marks is for the meaning as the quotation of a communication by another party.

:Claim of the Punctuation: Box: For the use of the pairs of the opening and closing: brackets, or parentheses is for the lack of the joinder with the communication of the body of the document by the law of the box. For the use of the box against the document is with the meaning as a private-note for the edification of the reader by the author. For the use of the box against a quotation is for the claims of the clarification of the meaning of the quotation.

For the sharing of these communications is for the spiritual-education, healing-benefit and sanctification of each living-soul as a private-communion with this minister, with the lack of any offer with the fiction-commerce of this world and with the lack of any negotiability between all parties as these cells in the Christ. For all truth and reality of all creation is with the ownership by the Creator. For all matters in the universe of each moment are as the gift for each soul with his love by our Lord. For any truth of these matters of this page and site for the study is for the knowledge and freedom of the soul, with the use with all love, charity, humility, honesty, wisdom and volition for the good of all souls of our friends and enemies, foreign and domestic, as a gift with the finding by the grace and will of our Lord. For all communications through this Ambassador of the Christ are by this Glen-Martin of the Swartwout-family©-commonlaw-trade-name/copyright/COPYCLAIM/copy-Christ with the claim of all powers for all truth in one law, with these claims with the law by our Lord:

~I: U.C.C.: §: ~I: ~CIII (UCC 103) with the correction of the language for the claims of the T.D.C. with the correction of the language for the claim of the Threat, Duress and Coersion by the Powers of this world against the will of our Lord; (Non A)ssumsit-Contract with the correction of the language for the lack of any authorization of any contract with the lack of full closure with the claim of the meaning of each word in the truth with the will by our Lord; and with the claim of the re:course for the freedom against the compelling of any benefit and against any claim of an occult-contract or claim of the commerce with any ficition; and with the claim of all re:course by our Lord.
~II: U.C.C.: §: ~I: ~CIII: ~VI (UCC 103.6) with the correction of the language for the claim of the common-Law of this Christendom of the sojourners of this Earth in the Kingdom of the Heaven with the creation and ownership by the Lord.
~III: U.C.C.: §: ~I: ~CCVII (UCC 207) with the correction of the language for the claim of the re:medy for the freedom of the contract against any force by the Powers of this world; with the claim of the volition against any contract of a debt-discharge with any association with the bankruptcy-scrip of the unity-States or with any fiction or fraud with the conveyance of any value; and with the claim of all re:medy by our Lord.
~IV: U.C.C.: §: ~I: ~CCVII: ~IV (UCC 207.4) With(out) the (Pre)judice with the correction of the language for the claim of the lack of any judgement of any Man by another Man; and with the claim of the judgement by our Lord.
~V: U.C.C.: §: ~I: ~CCVII: ~VII (UCC 207.7)with All Rights: (Re)serve(d) with the correction of the language for the claim of all rights, freedoms and powers by the will of our Lord.with the correction of the language for the claim against the waiver of any powers with the gift by our Lord.
~VI: New-Covenant with the correction of the language for the claim of one Law for the Love, Truth, Way and Life with the Will, Grace, Justice and Mercy by our Lord.
~VII: '"The law was made for man, not man for the law."' With the language correction of the claim: for the making of the law for the Men is with the lack of the making of the Men for the law, by our Creator.
:::'"the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient"'::: ~I: Timothy: ~I: ~IX.
~VIII: :::'"To love all people and all things is the key to being like God, the great lover"'::: Wisdom: ~XI: ~XXIV. :::'"You shall love your neighbor as yourself and the alien too."'::: Leviticus: ~IXX: ~IIXX, ~XXXIV; For the heart of the law is: love. :::'"You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, your whole soul, your whole strength."'::: :Deuteronomy: ~VI: ~V.
~IX: :::'"I have not come to destroy the Law but to fulfill it. Amen, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or tittle of the Law will be lost until it is all fulfilled…. Unless your justice exceeds that of the scribes and the Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven."'::: Matthew: ~V: ~XVII, ~IIXX, ~XX.

Statutes:	Regulations:
861	1.861-1
861(a)(1)	1.861-2
861(a)(2)	1.861-3
861(a)(3)	1.861-4
etcetera	etcetera
861(b)	1.861-8, 1.861-8T
862(a)	1.862-1(a)
862(b)	1.862-1(b)